Да вот даже в той книжке которая у Алексея на очереди, есть чего посмотреть про бомбардировки городов в ПМВ. Что обсуждали и предлагали сделать с Германией в ответ за налёты на Англию английские министры, и как предлагали забомбить Германию лондонцы в послании к королю.
Подробнее про ПМВ в книге "Biplanes and Bombsights: British Bombing in World War I"
Для примера чуть цитат из книжек
Подробнее про ПМВ в книге "Biplanes and Bombsights: British Bombing in World War I"
Для примера чуть цитат из книжек
Another gathering of Londoners at Tower Hill produced a telling message for delivery to the King: “Thousands of Londoners appeal to your Majesty to instruct your Ministers at once to make rigorous and continual air attacks on German towns and cities as reprisals for the murder of civilians—men, women, and children, even infants at their school desks—and if your Ministers do not take steps to protect us we implore your Majesty to dissolve Parliament and appoint Ministers who will do their duty. Failing any other solution we suggest the revival by Royal license of Letters of Mark granting the right to privateers of the air to carry havoc and destruction as reprisals into Germany.”
Rothermere forcefully voiced the same sentiments in private. Sir Almeric Fitzroy, following his conversation with the Air Minister, recorded Rothermere's thoughts in his diary.
December 28th.- Lord Rothermere's ideas on air reprisals are not lacking in force or comprehensiveness ; he is satisfied that no adequate effect will be produced in Germany unless the thing is done on a scale which, in point of thoroughness and terror, has not hitherto been dreamed of. His intention is, for every raid upon London, absolutely to wipe out one or two large Germantowns, either on the Rhine or in its affluent valleys. Frankfort itself does not lie beyond the bourne of his imaginings. For this purpose he contemplates the possibility of an attack in three divisions comprising each from 100 to 150 aeroplanes and carrying bombs enough to lay the place attacked level with ground in the course of a few hours. In favourable circumstances a sufficient number of machines may be at his disposal by the month of June. It is estimated that, among a people ravaged by hunger and despair, the panic will be instantaneous and complete.
December 28th.- Lord Rothermere's ideas on air reprisals are not lacking in force or comprehensiveness ; he is satisfied that no adequate effect will be produced in Germany unless the thing is done on a scale which, in point of thoroughness and terror, has not hitherto been dreamed of. His intention is, for every raid upon London, absolutely to wipe out one or two large Germantowns, either on the Rhine or in its affluent valleys. Frankfort itself does not lie beyond the bourne of his imaginings. For this purpose he contemplates the possibility of an attack in three divisions comprising each from 100 to 150 aeroplanes and carrying bombs enough to lay the place attacked level with ground in the course of a few hours. In favourable circumstances a sufficient number of machines may be at his disposal by the month of June. It is estimated that, among a people ravaged by hunger and despair, the panic will be instantaneous and complete.
Milner and the War Cabinet were clearly concerned with the conduct and magnitude of the air war against Germany. But as before, the political direction clashed with the priorities and concerns of the field commanders. These fundamentally incompatible outlooks also collided within the new Air Ministry, in the persons of Lord Rothermere, secretary of state for the Air Force ("Royal Air Force" after March 1918), and, his chief of Air Staff, General Trenchard.
Lord Rothermere aggressively supported the augmented bombing campaign. In this, he enjoyed public support and encouragement. Responding to a toast in his honor as the Air Minister in December 1917, Rothermere presented his philosophy unambiguously.
At the Air Board we are wholeheartedly in favour of air reprisals. It is our duty to avenge the murder of innocent women and children. As the enemy elects, so it will be the case of "eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," and in this respect we shall slave for complete and satisfying retaliation. . . . We are determined, in other words, that whatever outrages are committed on the civilian population of this country will be met by similar treatment on his own people .
The editor of Flight hailed this outlook as an "admirably clear explanation" of the air policy to be expected in the near future." His editorial, entitled "Our Own Policy of Reprisals," called for massive bombing, linking Rothermere's assault on German morale with the military necessity to defend Britain. He conceded that it was tempting to agree with the Air Minister.
[We should] place our policy of counter raids on no higher a plane than that of avenging the murders of our defenseless civilians . But we think the matter goes far beyond that. In the first place, the duty is laid upon our authorities of defending our shores, and if that can only be done-as we believe to be the case-by raiding the enemy's towns from the air until he cries for mercy, then let us raid them as often and as heavily as need be. . . . We regret the necessity, but we cannot get away from the fact that the necessity has been forced upon us by the prior action of an enemy who has adopted frightfulness as his creed in the belief that he was the only one with a stomach for it .
In this fusion of moral and strategic effects, reprisals became acceptable for two reasons: Germany, the first to adopt terror tactics, deserved punishment; further, such a counteroffensive handily complemented the related issue of home defense.
Lord Rothermere aggressively supported the augmented bombing campaign. In this, he enjoyed public support and encouragement. Responding to a toast in his honor as the Air Minister in December 1917, Rothermere presented his philosophy unambiguously.
At the Air Board we are wholeheartedly in favour of air reprisals. It is our duty to avenge the murder of innocent women and children. As the enemy elects, so it will be the case of "eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," and in this respect we shall slave for complete and satisfying retaliation. . . . We are determined, in other words, that whatever outrages are committed on the civilian population of this country will be met by similar treatment on his own people .
The editor of Flight hailed this outlook as an "admirably clear explanation" of the air policy to be expected in the near future." His editorial, entitled "Our Own Policy of Reprisals," called for massive bombing, linking Rothermere's assault on German morale with the military necessity to defend Britain. He conceded that it was tempting to agree with the Air Minister.
[We should] place our policy of counter raids on no higher a plane than that of avenging the murders of our defenseless civilians . But we think the matter goes far beyond that. In the first place, the duty is laid upon our authorities of defending our shores, and if that can only be done-as we believe to be the case-by raiding the enemy's towns from the air until he cries for mercy, then let us raid them as often and as heavily as need be. . . . We regret the necessity, but we cannot get away from the fact that the necessity has been forced upon us by the prior action of an enemy who has adopted frightfulness as his creed in the belief that he was the only one with a stomach for it .
In this fusion of moral and strategic effects, reprisals became acceptable for two reasons: Germany, the first to adopt terror tactics, deserved punishment; further, such a counteroffensive handily complemented the related issue of home defense.
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